Arms
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The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. It is a unique resource for researchers, policy-makers and analysts, the media and civil society interested in monitoring and measuring the international flow of major conventional arms.
The publicly accessible database is updated every spring. A brief overview of highlights of the preceding year and more general trends in international arms transfers is published to coincide with the release of each year's new dataset. A broader analysis is published every year in the SIPRI Yearbook.
This interface provides the total trend-indicator value (TIV) of arms imports or exports for a selection of the largest suppliers or recipients, along with the TIV of global arms imports or exports.
SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources.
The sample is designed to provide coverage of all farms in the 48 contiguous States plus state level data for 15 major cash receipts states. The farm population includes all establishments which produced and sold, or would normally have sold, at least $1,000 of agricultural products during the previous year. A sample from the NASS list frame is supplemented by a sample of area tracts to ensure complete coverage.
NASS publishes two reports from ARMS. The first is called Agricultural Chemical Usage - Field Crops and is released in May following the Phase II data collection. The second report is the Farm Production Expenditures, compiled from the Phase III, is released in August. ERS prepares several state, regional, and national reports using ARMS data including Commodity Production Costs and Returns, Farm Operating and Financial Characteristics and the Annual Report to Congress on the Status of Family Farms.
The ARMS collects production practices and cost of production data on selected commodities. The ARMS also collects detailed whole farm financial information from a representative sample of farms and ranches across the country. ARMS is collected in three data collection phases:
The initial phase, ARMS Screening survey, collects general farm data such as crops grown, livestock inventory, and value of sales. Screening data are used to qualify (or screen) farms for the other phases.
In the Middle Ages, arms referred to various weapons (e.g., bows and arrows, catapults) and equipment of war, including defensive shields and armor. Today, arms for weaponry can sound a little dated, except for expressions like arms race, first used in the 1920s for the competitive buildup of weapons between nations (then nuclear arms race) and later extended as a metaphor for any competition.
A coat of arms was originally a type of outerwear that medieval knights wore in battle. They bore heraldic symbols representing who they were and who they were fighting for. Families and organizations later adopted these emblems as crests.
Governments also have a responsibility to ensure public safety and have a vested interest in providing human security and development to their citizens. Therefore, ensuring that arms in private ownership do not enter illicit circuits must be part of the equation for every country.
The Met collection of arms and armor is a modern one, formed through the activities and interests of curators, trustees, private collectors, and donors over the past 125 years. The collection comprises approximately fourteen thousand objects, of which more than five thousand are European, two thousand are from the Near East, and four thousand from the Far East. It is one of the most comprehensive and encyclopedic collections of its kind.
More recently, The Met's collection became significantly stronger in key areas thanks to prominent collectors' gifts and promised gifts of exceptional objects in honor of the Museum's 150th Anniversary, and most notably the generous and transformative promised gift from Ronald S. Lauder of his unrivaled private collection of European arms and armor.
The strength of the department's collection lies in its diversity, depth, and quality. The section of European arms and armor is perhaps the best known. While European armor dating before about 1500 is very rare, the department possesses a selection of important examples from the 14th and 15th centuries, including a group of helmets and pieces of armor found in the ruins of a Venetian fortress at Chalcis, on the Greek island of Euboea, which document several distinctive and otherwise unknown forms of armor worn in the eastern Mediterranean before 1470, when Chalcis fell to the Turks. From the 16th century there are numerous examples of sumptuously decorated armor and weapons, including items made for the Electors of Saxony and their bodyguard troops; a select group of English armors made in the Royal Workshops at Greenwich, founded by Henry VIII; and a personal armor made for Henry II, King of France. French firearms of the 17th to 19th centuries are also a strength of the collection, with five guns from the personal collection of King Louis XIII, lavishly decorated firearms from Napoleonic period, and arms made for the industrial exhibitions of the mid- to late 19th century that are masterpieces of original design and traditional craftsmanship.
The collection of American arms features several swords ranging from the late 18th to the late 19th centuries, including ornate presentation swords made to commemorate actions in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. The legendary Colt revolver is well represented by a series of models dating from the 1830s to the 1870s, including a sumptuous gold-inlaid Third Model Dragoon revolver, one of the most elaborately decorated Colts ever made. Other highlights include a small group of late 19th-century Smith & Wesson revolvers decorated in silver and other materials by Tiffany and Company, New York's preeminent silversmiths and jewelers.
Founded in 2004 by Jeffrey Lewis, Arms Control Wonk was the first blog on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. It has since been a home to everything that is \"too wonky or obscene\" for publication about nuclear weapons. The site now features thirty-plus contributors with an archive of over three thousand articles.
At least 2 million people around the world are living with firearm injuries in non-conflict settings; millions more suffer the profound psychological effects that firearms violence brings to individuals, families and the wider community. [Source: Small Arms Survey]
The Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties, known as START I and START II, were agreements to reduce the number of long-range nuclear weapons in the United States and the former Soviet Union. START I was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1991, and it was followed by the conclusion of the START II treaty between the United States and Russia in 1993. When Ronald Reagan assumed the U.S. Presidency in 1981, provisions for continuing the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) that yielded two arms agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1970s were already in place. The first round of SALT produced the Antiballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and a framework for reducing caps on nuclear warhead delivery systems, and the second round (SALT II) produced a treaty limiting these delivery systems that was signed but never ratified. In spite of the difficulties involved in ratification of the second agreement, both sides adhered to the terms of SALT II and expressed an interest in moving forward with a third round of talks. In late 1981, Reagan proposed that the talks be renamed the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, to place the focus of the subsequent negotiations on deep cuts in existing weapons, not simply limits on future deployments. As a part of this announcement, Reagan also suggested bilateral negotiations on the elimination of intermediate range nuclear weapons.
The initial proposals offered by the Reagan Administration to the Soviet Union called for a fifty percent reduction in total strategic weapons. U.S. officials realized that such a drastic change in policy would likely be rejected by the Soviets, but they had their own reasons to make the suggestion. In the 1980s, a growing nuclear \"freeze\" movement called for the elimination of nuclear weapons, spurred on in part by the promulgation of scientific studies that forecast a \"nuclear winter\" effect. This scientific prediction assumed that the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world would effectively destroy the earth's capacity for sustaining human life. The Reagan proposals for broad reductions in nuclear arms reflected an effort by Reagan Administration officials to deflect the criticism directed at them by antinuclear activists for continuing the arms race. By proposing reductions that the Soviets were sure to resist, the Reagan Administration could blame the ongoing arms race on the Soviet Union and justify continued U.S. development of strategic weapons. At the same time, however, this approach to arms control led Moscow to abandon talks in 1983.
After Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union in 1985, the two countries resumed arms control discussions. At a summit meeting in Reykjavik in 1986, Reagan once again proposed a fifty percent reduction in long range strategic weapons. At this point, Gorbachev was far more inclined to consider the proposal and act upon it, because economic problems in the Soviet Union made ending, or at least curtailing, the expensive nuclear arms race a necessity. What prevented a deal at this juncture was not the ambitious nature of the proposal, but the ongoing U.S. research into a missile defense system under President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets argued that under the1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty developing a missile defense system was illegal, and they demanded that the United States halt research on the project before any agreement be reached on long-range strategic weapons reductions. A 1987 agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union provided a way around this impasse by calling for fifty percent reductions in long-range strategic weapons and a new treaty to reconfirm a mutual commitment to the ABM Treaty. Although this agreement appeared to have solved the problem, the treaty was not completed before the end of the Reagan Administration. 59ce067264
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